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SOUTH AFRICAN STRATEGY AND NAMIBIAN DECOLONISATION
Christopher Saunders
As Namibia becomes independent, it is timely to reflect on the
reasons why South African policy towards that territory changed
over time and what led to the decision to bring seventy—five
years o-f rule to an end. The events and calculations o-f 1988,
when that decision was taken, cannot be understood without
tracing the background, and in particular the South African
decision in 1978 to accept a settlement under United Nations (UN)
auspices. In surveying key issues in South African policy to
Namibia since the early 1970s. this paper inevitably traverses
some ground covered in works by Du Pisani, Katjavivi and others,
C13 but does so to highlight why South African strategy in
relation to Namibia changed over time. Any attempt to examine
this must be more or less unsatisfactory until the release of
evidence explaining why key decisions were taken. It is,
however, not likely that such records will be made available in
the near future, and in the meantime we can identify the main
questions to ask, and by contextualising what we know, and
examining the available evidence as critically as possible, we
may get some way towards answers.
Gone with the WindhoekC23
Separations are never simple, not even Rhett Butler's from
Scarlett O'Hara. Namibian decolonisation differs in many ways
from other cases of African decolonisation. Namibia's
'metropole' was not a distant European country, but the neighbour
next door, and Namibia's special international status helped
produce a pre—independence election monitored by the UN. But
there are some parallels: like the French in Algeria and the
British in Kenya, the South Africans fought a war to retain their
control of the territory in the face of popular resistance. As
in those other erases, the white settlers and their allies were in
effect ditched when the costs of retaining possession became too
high, and in the face of international demands for withdrawal.
In Namibia as elsewhere, war radicalised the nationalist
movement, and that radicalisation for a time reduced the
likelihood of the withdrawal of the colonial power . When the
idea of withdrawal was accepted, the departing colonial power
hoped the successor regime'would be a semi-captive, neo-colonial
one. In the Namibian case, especially, where the "metropoie' had
a stranglehold over the ex-colony's economy, political
independence could not mean economic independence from the
ex-ruler. Despite this, the South African government for long
refused to withdraw, then rather unexpectedly decided to do so.
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Why?
Let us first notice that the issue of Namibian independence
would probably not have arisen had Smuts, an ardent imperialist,
got his way and formally incorporated the territory in South
Africa itself, as he tried to do on two occasions. After the
First World War he was foiled in his annexation plans by the very
mandate scheme for the former German colonies which he had helped
devise; he had not expected it to be applied in the case of South
West Africa. After the Second World war, having played a major
part in creating the UN, he decided he should ask it to approve
annexation. The UN did not only reject his request; it demanded
that South West Africa become a UN trust territory. South Africa
rejected that out of hand, Namibia remained as much a South
African colony as it had been between the wars; in terms of the
mandate granted in 1920, South Africa was allowed to rule South
West Africa as if it were an integral part of South Africa
itself. Until the early 1970s, South Africa moved ever closer to
ruling the territory as a de facto fifth province. As Smuts said
of it in 1946: 'We have the fullest authority and we have
exercised it and whether you call it sovereignty or not seems to
be just a juggling with words... The facts a,re quite clear: we
have the power.' C33 And for a long time what was all-important
was that power, which came from ruling the territory, not whether
or not it was formally part of South Africa. In the long run,
however, the fact that the territory had an international status,
and was not part of South Africa, was crucial in determining its
future.
Afrikaner nationalists had opposed the initial conquest,
because they were against South African participation in what
they regarded as Britain's war; for them the Germans were not
enemies. But when an Afrikaner nationalist government took
office, it was as determined as its predecessors to retain
control of the territory. After all,
- white South Africans had been settled in South West Africa,
and they looked to Pretoria for support;
- the territory was a possible springboard from which South
African could move further into Africa: the Caprivi Strip
extended to the Zambesi River;
- that the territory was rich in copper and diamonds was known
before South African conquest, and the cost of ruling - the
administration established was a minimal one — was far outweighed
by the profits South Africans, and others, derived from their
investments there, in the mining sector, which remained dominant
and diversified over time, in the fishing industry and in
commercial farming;
- and no South African government wanted to contemplate the
possibility of the teritory north of the Orange falling under a
hostile government.
There was, too, unwillingness to withdraw from a territory
ruled since 1915. South Africa was to concede in principle the
idea of Namibian independence in the early 1970s, but its
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military presence greatly increased in the 1970s and early 1980s
as the border war with SWAPQ was carried deeper and deeper into
Angola. The lives lost in that war did not make it easier for a
South African government to give up the territory. As recently
as 1987, the South A-frican Minister of De-fence stated that his
govenment was not prepared to see a SWAPQ government in Windhoek.
This was not just because of opposition to what was seen to be a
Marxist organisation, friendly to the Soviet Union and Cuba,
coming to power in a territory ruled by South Africa; SWAPQ's
armed struggle against South Africa could not be seen to have
succeeded. Yet, despite the fact that on innumerable occasions
over the years representatives of the South African government
had castigated and denounced the UN, and decried its bias, that
government had in 1978 agreed to a plan for a UN-monitored
election in Namibia. In 1988 it agreed that that plan should be
implemented, which meant an election which SWAPO won, and an end
to South African rule of the territory in 1990. What produced so
remarkable a change in policy?
From Defiance to Concessions
It was in 1950 that the International Court of Justice at the
Hague delivered an opinion that, while not requiring South Africa
to make South West Africa a UN trust territory, as the General
Assembly wanted, nevertheless accepted that that Assembly had
taken over the supervisory role which had belonged previously to
the League of Nations. As is well known, South Africa totally
rejected the numerous resolutions of the General Assembly - 73
between 1950 and 1965C43 - calling on it to withdraw from the
territory and transfer authority to the UN. But as decolonisation
was completed in tropical Africa, and advanced to the borders of
South Africa itself with the independence of the High Commission
territories, Pretoria came under increasing international
pressure to withdraw from Namibia. In- 1966 the International
Court refused to judge whether or not South Africa had violated
the spirit and terms of the mandate, and the General assembly
voted to revoke the mandate and assume direct responsibility for
the territory. In itself that was yet another impotent gesture.
But when the Security Council recognised that decision, declared
the continued presence of South Africa in the territory illegal
and called on all states to. act accordingly, and more especially
when in June 1971 the International Court delivered its opinion
that South Africa had to withdraw, and all members of the UN had
to recognise the illegality of the South African regime north of
the Orange River, Pretoria decided that it could not afford to
ignore international opimdn.CS] South Africa's chief trading
partners were, after all, permanent members of the Security
Council, which could institute mandatory sanctions.
The Court's 1971 Opinion that South African rule was illegal
helped precipitate Namibian resistance in the form of a
large-scale Namibian contract workers' strike, which probably
helped persuade Prime Minister Vorster to begin, hesitantly and
ambiguously, to move in the direction the UN wanted. Though by
1973 it appeared that there was deadlock, with the UN demanding
South African withdrawal and South Africa proposing to lead
portions o-f the territory to Bantustan independence on the model
then being evolved in South Africa itself, with hindsight we can
see that South A-frica began to make important concessions in the
early 1970s. In February 1971, the South A-frican government
suggested to the International Court that they jointly supervise
a plebiscite o-f all the inhabitants o-f the territory on whether
South A-frican rule should continue. C63 That Vorster was prepared
to discuss the future o-f the territory with the UN Secretary
General and his representative in 1972-3 implied an
acknowledgement that the UN might play some role in the
independence process. Vorster's statements after these visits
were open to the interpretation that he had abandoned the idea
that South Africa might someday annex all or part of the
territory, and that if its inhabitants wished it might, as one
unit, be led towards independence.C7] A pragmatist in external
policy, Vorster set much store by his "outward policy', his
attempt to break the increasing isolation of the apartheid regime
by winning friends and influencing leaders in black Africa. But
speaking of eventual independence, and creating an advisory
council for the territory as a whole, albeit it of ethnic
representatives, was one thing; to Vorster the idea of BWAPO -
especially after it was recognised, by a Seneral Assembly angered
by its impotence, as 'the sole and authentic representative of
the Namibian people' - taking over in Windhoek was anathema. The
armed struggle launched in 1966 posed no threat at this stage,
and if anything reinforced Vorster's determination to ensure
SWAF'O's elimination; the general strike of contract workers which
followed the International Court's Opinion may have helped
persuade Vorster that what Du Pisani has called 'controlled
change' was necessary north of the Orange River.C83
After the Cisbon coup of April 1974 Vorster realised that
Angolan independence would greatly increase pressure for change
in Namibia, and so summoned the Turnhal.le constitutional
conference, hoping that it would devise a way for South Africa to
transfer power to an anti-SWAF'O party, which would then invite
the South African army to remain until such time as it could
itself deal with any military threat from SWAPO. Such an
'internal settlement' - a misleading name, in as much as it would
be arranged in Pretoria - would be a form of decolonisation which
would ensure that Pretoria retained real influence in the
territory after independence, so that its interests would be
safeguarded. But how to find collaborators, the majority of whom
would have to be black, with significant support? The Turnhalle,
composed of ethnic representatives, unsurprisingly produced an
ethnic constitution. SWAPO would have nothing to do with the
Turnhalle and in response intensified the war on the northern
border from the new bases it was now able to establish in
Angola.C93 The UN Security Council's response was resolution 385
of January 1976, which called for an election in Namibia under UN
auspices.
By the mid 1970s, the UN had taken part in a number of
peacekeeping operations, in the Congo in 1960, in Cyprus and in
the Middle East. The closest parallel to what was now proposed
for Namibia was its operation in West New Guinea, where in the
early 1960s it acted as temporary executive authority for eight
months, and later supervised a plebiscite, in which the voters of
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that territory had decided they wanted to remain under Indonesian
administration. CIO] In Namibia, unlike New Guinea, the UN had a
special claim to be a transitional authority: by virtue o-f its
own resolutions, it was already the government o+ Namibia.
Resolution 385 seemed to require - though this was not spelt out
the withdrawal o-f South African military -forces and
administration, leaving the UN as the sole authority during the
transition period in which the election would be held.
Early in 1977, knowing Pretoria would not contemplate such a
withdrawal, and -fearing that it would instead go ahead with an
internal settlement — holding an election in terms of the
Turnhalle constitution and then transferring power to the victor
— the Western Five Contact Group, led by the representative o-f
the new Carter administration in the United States, began
negotiations with both Pretoria and SWAPO to get them to agree to
a common -formula which would not run counter to resolution 385
yet would provide -for a -form of transition which both could
accept. To Pretoria, the Contact Group offered the idea of a
UN-monitored election held during a transition period in which
there would be a UN military presence but in which the South
Africans would continue to be responsible for law and order and
would continue to administer the territory.
the Contact Group was able to confront Pretoria with two facts:
firstly, that an internal settlement excluding SWAPO would mean
that the war in the north, then increasing in scale, would
continue. Some said there was the possibility of a repetition of
the Rhodesian situation, where the guerrillas had taken over
large parts of the country; and that the Cubans in Angola might
intervene south of the Cunene River in support of SWAPO. The
second fact was that no government which emerged as a result of
such an internal settlement would receive international
recognition. A UN-monitored election, on the other hand, could
mean an end to the war and international recognition for the new
government. Vorster saw the logic of these arguments and took
seriously the threat which accompanied them: that if Pretoria did
not accept the deal, the Western countries might be unable to
resist the mounting pressure in the 'Security Council tor the
imposition of mandatory trade sanctions on South Africa tor its
failure to comply with the UN's resolutions on Namibia. The South
African government therefore accepted the plan for a UN-monitored
election. After that, the UN Secretary—General made proposals
for implementation, which involved the establishment o-f a UN
Transitional Assistance Group. His report was approved in
Security Council Resolution 435 of September 1978. "Resolution
435' then became accepted shorthand for the entire plan for
transition via a UN-monitored election to an independent Namibia.
Why 435 was not implemented for a decade
Pretoria's April 1978 decision to accept the plan did not mean
that the South African government was now prepared to see an
election take place which SWAPO would be likely to win. When he
accepted the plan in principle, Vorster almost certainly hoped




raid on the SWAF'O base at Cassinga, in which a large number of
civilians were killed, was probably launched in part to ensure
such a rejection.C113 But though SWAF'O strongly disliked the
proposed transitional arrangements, it was persuaded by the
Frontline states to accept the plan: as SWAPO claimed
overwhelming support in the country, and.the UN was to certify
the election free and fair, it could hardly reject the plan
outright. When SWAPO accepted and said it was ready to observe a
cease-fire, Pretoria continued administering the territory almost
as if the plan did not exist; the coming to power of P.W.Botha
represented the triumph of the military, who after the failure of
the invasion of Angola in 1975-6 had become committed to the
notion of "total strategy' in the face of the 'total
onslaught'.C123 They believed they could defeat SWAPO on the
battlefield and through a 'hearts and minds' campaign in the
north, and that toughness, not concessions, should be the name of
the game. International condemnation of the internal election
held in December 197S was brushed aside, and Pretoria now raised
problem after problem with the proposed way in which the Western
plan was to be implemented, while also questioning whether the UN
could in fact be an impartial monitor of the election.
Various possible scenerios presented themselves to the bouth
African government: given time, perhaps BWAPO could be
marginalised and an anti-SWAPO coalition be built with sufficient
support to enable it.to win a UN-monitored election. Or the UN
plan could eventually be bypassed and power transferred to a
non-SWAF'O government, which might be able to achieve a measure of
international recognition. For some months in 1979 it seemed
that the Muzorewa government elected in April that year as the
result of an internal settlement might win such recognition. It
did not, in the event, and in the election held in terms of the
Lancaster House agreement early the following year Mugabe's ZANU
swept to power, which suggested that SWAPO would probably do the
same in any UN-monitored election in Namibia. Despite Mugabe's
reconci 1 iatory attitude to white Zimbabweans after his election,
the South African government made clear that its 'bottom line'
was 'no Moscow flag in Windhoek', F'i k Botha, the Foreign
Minister, told an American envoy in December 1981.C133 The DTA,
victor in the internal election of 1978, had been installed as
the government in Windhoek the following year, but its base of
support remained narrow and Mudge, its leader, seemed unlikely to
do better than Muzorewa. In 1983, therefore, Pretoria took power
back into its own hands, then forged a broader anti-SWAPO
coalition, the Multi-Party Conference, which included, along with
the DTA, breakaway fragments from both SWAPO and SWANU. Members
of the Multi-Party Conference were then installed in office as
the so-called Transitional Government of National Unity in June
1985.
Meanwhile, between 1978 and 1982 the Contact broup had made
concession after concession to try to.get Pretoria to agree to
the implementation of resolution 435. The plan accepted in 1978
was in outline form only. As the details were filled in, and
South Africa raised objections, the plan was revised in a number
of instances to meet those objections. SWAPO"s bases in Angola
and Zambia were to be monitored, while nothing more was said
about SWAF'O bases within Namibia. The constitutional guidelines
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of July 1982, concerning the -form of government after
independence, were designed to give protection to minorities.
This addendum to resolution 435 required that the constitution to
be drafted by the 72 member Constituent Assembly should be
adopted by a two-thirds vote of that body. Again, the Frontline
States, impressed with Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, persuaded
SWAPO to agree to this major concession. After that, Pretoria
said that its concerns about resolution 435 had been met, but
only because by then it had a new reason for delaying
implementation of resolution 435. The Reagan administration, more
concerned about what it saw as the threat of the spread of
communism than the independence of Namibia, wanted the Cubans out
of Angola, and Chester Crocker, the new Assistant Secretary of
State for African Affairs, said Pretoria's 'security concerns'
had to be recognised. More generally, he believed that positive
inducements would be most likely to make Pretoria co-operate;
constructive engagement meant in practice that Pretoria could act
as it wished in the region, while in the idea of linkage, the
American administration gave the South African government grounds
to refuse to implement resolution 435.
The most frequently heard argument against linkage was that
Namibian independence had nothing to do with the presence of the
Cuban troops in Angola. But it was the Cubans who maintained that
their presence there was a response to South African
interventionist!, though there is considerable evidence that Cuban
combat troops were being readied for Angola before the South
African invasion in October 1975.C14] The destabi1isation of
Angola was not in itself the prime reason for South African
intervention; even Operation Savannah, the abortive invasion of
1975-76 to prevent the MPLA coming to power, was undertaken
primarily because it was known that such a government would
support SWAPO.[15] The relatively small - compared to what came
later - Cuban force in Angola in early 1976 had begun withdrawing
as the South Africans withdrew, but the Cuban withdrawal had been
stopped when the South Africans began overflying Angola and as
the South-African backed UNITA insurgency grew.t16] The Cubans
remained in Angola chiefly as a counter to continued South
African intervention, but also to deal with the threat posed by
UNITA. So they could not withdraw until Namibia was granted its
independence. Pretoria, on the other hand, insisted that they
withdraw before implementation of resolution 435.
After P.W. Botha assumed office as Prime Minister in 1978,
South African intervention in Angola steadily escalated, from
cross-border raids to wipe out SWAPO bases, to deeper incursions
and the occupation of large, parts of the southern third of the
country from 1981 on.[17] In February 1984, after the number of
national servicemen casulties had risen sharply in Operation
Askari, Pretoria signed an accord with Luanda by which its forces
were to withdraw from southern Angola, but hardly had they done
so than those who wanted to take strong action to counter the
activities of the ANC and SWAPO again gained the upper hand in
the South African State Security Council. Not only was a South
African Defence Force commando caught attempting to blow up
oil-storage tanks at Cabinda in the far north of Angola but soon
SADF involvement in southern Angola was greater than ever, and
now was not mainly to destroy SWAPO bases - SWAPO was no longer a
military threat - but to save UNITA from de+eat in the first o+ a
series o-f tank-led, dry—season offensives launched against it by
FAPLA, the Angolan army.
In the face o-f this massive South African intervention, it was
hardly surprising that neither the Angolans nor the Cubans would
consider the withdrawal o-f the Cuban military contingent, though
in these years it remained away from the frontline and did not
directly engage the South African forces. Crocker continued to
believe in linkage, not just because it would remove what the
Reagan administration saw as a Soviet proxy force, but because he
believed that such a quid-pro-quo was essential to make Pretoria
agree, ultimately, to Namibian independence, and he saw Cuban
withdrawal as necessary to bring about an end to the Angolan
civil war. "
The result was that in middle 1980s few held out any hope that
resolution 435 would ever be implemented. When he went to Europe
in 1984, before the start of the revolt in the townships, P.W.
Botha made play of the financial burden on his government of
continuing to rule Namibia, and suggested that the Western powers
should take over the territory, but the offer was not taken
seriously. The Transitional government installed in 1985
appointed a committee to draft a new constitution, and again some
kind of internal settlement seemed likely. The Contact Group
gave up trying to achieve implementation and, by the end of 1986,
direct American mediation had collapsed. Because the Reagan
administration's decided to supply UNITA with arms Lagain
possible, following the repeal of the Clark amendment, this step
was taken to ensure that UNITA was not defeated by Angolan forces
now massively armed by the Soviet Union and to make UN11A less
dependent on the South Africans], the Angolan government broke
off negotiations with the Americans. And Pretoria, for its part,
was much angered when the United States imposed, at long last,
limited sanctions, not because of South Africa's continued
occupation of Namibia but because of the harsh way in wnicn the
uprising of 1984-6 was suppressed. The uprising in the townships
helped focus attention on South Africa rather than Namibia.
Nujoma was quoted as saying that he did not expect Namibian
independence until it was granted by President Mandela.
Though constructive engagement had failed to achieve anything
on the Namibian issue, the United States continued to veto
sanctions against South Africa at the UN on the grounds that
Pretoria had not rejected resolution 435, and might still agree
to implementation, and, secondly, because once the Security
Council had imposed mandatory sanctions only it could remove
them, which would give the Soviet Union a veto over American
foreign policy. During these years, Newmont mining continued to
own a thirty per cent share of the Tsumeb mine - American Metal
Climax (AMAX) sold its thirty per cent stake to Sold Fields South
Africa in 1982 - and shareholders in Rip Tinto Zinc and De Beers
did well from R&ssing Uranium and Consolidated Diamond Mines.CIS]
But were the long-drawn out Contact Group negotiations on
Namibia, followed by the negotiations by the Americans, never a
sincere attempt to achieve independence, but just a smokescreen,
to provide an excuse for not taking action against South Africa?
It is true that the Western powers involved - the US, the UK,
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Germany, France and Canada -all had economic interests in the
territory, and that none welcomed SWAPO's radical rhetoric. But
the smokescreen argument implies a degree of conspiracy and
deceit among a group of nations involved collectively in
diplomacy over many years which is difficult to imagine. The
charge against the Western countries is not that they negotiated
in bad faith, but that they did not use all the means at their
disposal, including sanctions, to try to bring about a settlement
of the Namibian issue by a certain date. The result was the
prolongation of South African occupation. There was little
urgency in the negotiations; as Marianne Spiegel has shown, the
Contact Group itself was responsible for long delays. C \*)3
The advent of the Transitional government in 1V85, and with it
a slight relaxation of the harsh repression against oppositional
politics in Namibia, enabled such politics to revive: the
Mineworkers Union of Namibia was launched and the National Union
of Namibian Workers reorganised in 1986, rallies were held, and
numerous school and youth groups, under the leadership of the
Namibian National Student Organisation, staged protests which
were clearly influenced by the challenge to state power in South
Africa at this time. The claim that such resistance, together
with the armed struggle, played a major role in bringing aoout
Namibian independence, is true only in an indirect sense: as we
shall see, neither SWAPO's armed struggle nor internal resistance
was primarily responsible for persuading Pretoria to decide to
agree to implementation of the UN plan. Had SWAF-'O's armed
struggle been more successful, indeed, Pretoria might have been
less inclined to have allowed independence: it agreed to the
implementation of resolution 435 in part because it could argue
that the armed struggle had failed. But this 'failure' was in
terms of the military threat it posed; the armed struggle was
always - at least for those not in the People's Liberation Army
of Namibia [PLAN] - only one element of SWAPO's strategy, not
likely to achieve a transfer of power on its own. Though
defeated in the field in northern Namibia, SWAPO always had new
recruits to train, so the war continued, and in that sense the
armed struggle was successful, for in the long run it helped wear
down the South Africans and raised the cost of ruling Namibia to
a level which Fretoria finally found unacceptable.C2O3
Why South Africa agreed to the implementation of 435
In the early and middle 1980s, a few far-sighted commentators
predicted that when South Africa, Angola and Cuba had exnausted
themselves on the battlefield, and decided that the cost OT
continuing the war was outweighed by the benefits that would
accrue from a settlement, there would be a settlement.1213 No-one
could, however, predict the fortuitious combination of events
which brought the parties together in 1988, and led to the
agreement to implement resolution 435. Before turning to those
events, and the calculations which persuaded the bouth fttncan
government to accept Namibian independence, let us first note
that by the end of 19S7 various developments had taken place
which made a negotiated agreement of the issues of Cuban
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withdrawal and Namibian independence more likely than
previously.
Firstly, the international climate had undergone a remarkable
change, -following Gorbachev's rise to power in the Soviet Union.
He realised that he could not both restructure the domestic
economy and finance -foreign adventures - in 1937 the Soviet union
supplied an estimated $1 billion o+ military hardware to rtngoia -
and he wished to improve relations with the United States. For
both these reasons, he set out to do what he could to resolve
regional con-f 1icts.C223. The Angolan/Namibian issue was
discussed at the superpower summit at Reykjavik in Uctober i9Si>,
then in July 1987 between Crocker and his Soviet counterpart,
Deputy Foreign Minister Anatoly Adamishin; then again in
Washington in December 1987. By the end of 1997, the Soviet
Union was committed to pulling out o+ Afghanistan and had made it
clear that it was in favour of a negotiated settlement in
Angola/Namibia. No longer anticipating imminent change in South
Africa itself, the Soviet Union accepted that concessions would
have to be made to the apartheid regime in order to bring about
Namibian independence. For its part, the Reagan administration,
which was to leave office in January 1989, was very keen to show
something for the years of constructive engagement. A foreign
policy success would also help boost George Bush's chances of
succeeding as president.
In South Africa itself, by the end of 1987 the uprising in the
townships had been suppressed and it was clear to all observers
that the state was not likely to come under serious threat for a
long time to come. At the same time, the financial sanctions
imposed in the wake of F'resident Botha's Rubicon -fiasco - the
decision by creditor banks not to roll over short-term loans and
not to grant further loans - greatly increased the government's
concern about the enormous and ever growing cost of the war in
Angola - one estimate is that by 1987 this was Rl,500 million a
year - on top of the cost of administering Namibia, where since
1980 Proclamation A(3 8 had spawned an even more bloated and
corrupt set of bureaucracies than the tricameral system in South
Africa. With little growth in the Namibian economy, tax revenues
had fallen and demands for direct transfers from the South
African treasury - over R300 million in 1987 - had increased.
The sanctions which Congress imposed on South Africa, over a
presidential veto, in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act o+
1986 applied to Namibia as well, because it was under South
African occupation. Rossing Uranium, which contributed over 2CT/.
of Namibia's revenue by 1937, found it increasingly difficult to
market its product, as Britain, France, Japan and other countries
came under pressure not to renew contracts. Independence for
Namibia would mean the end of such sanctions. From that point of
view, Rossing in particular stood to benefit from it.
The Transitional government, though more clearly 'multi-racial'
than its DTA predecessor, had proved no more successful in
showing its independence of the South African administration by
bringing about the kind of change which might have begun to' win
it a broad measure of legitimacy: schools remained firmly
segregated and - the most cited example of its impotence - the
name of the airport at Windhoek remained J.G. Strijdom. The South
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African administration, still -fearful of white reactions both in
Namibia and in South Africa, refused to abolish the ethnic
structures of A6 8, which suggests that even into early 1966 it
did not think that resolution 435 would be implemented in the
near future. It continued to believe that domestic political
considerations - the reaction of its electorate and that of the
oppressed majority in South Africa itself - ruled out
implementation.
And there was war-weariness in both Angola and Cuba by late
1987. Angola had been engulfed in war since before
independence. The offensives launched against UNITA had all.
thanks to South African intervention, failed. Over forty percent
of state expenditure was soing on the war in the south, and
leading members of the government were eager to begin the
reconstruction of the country, which seemed to require membership
of the International Monetary Fund and the aid which the
Americans, who still refused to recognise the government, might
supply. The numbers of Cubans dying in Angola increased greatly
in the mid 1960s, and some of those returning did so with Aids.
Castro did not share the disillusionment of leading members of
his forces in Angola,C23] but he had to recognise that Gorbachev
might not be ready to continue underwriting the cost of the war
indefinitely.
It was, however, Castro who did more than anyone to precipitate
the events leading to the Accords signed in lV<d8. fingered at the
way that South African intervention (Operation Modular) had once
again defeated the FAPLH advance against UNlff-i, he agreed,
meeting with Dos Santos in Havana in November 1987, to escalate
Cuban involvement.C243 He not only ordered his forces to engage
the South Africans directly, but also sent another 15,000 crack
troops from Havana direct to the front lines in southern
Angola.[25] At Cuito Cuanavale, where the FAPLA/Cuban/PLAN forces
were challenged strongly by South African and UNITA troops in a
series of battles in early 19SB, there was no victor: C26II the
massive bombardment by the S-5 and G-6 cannons of the South
African artillery consumed F\'2G0m worth of shells but the town did
not fall.C27] The South African airforce . lost dominance of
the air, because of the highly sophisticated radar air defence
system now in place, and because the Cuban and Angolan pilots
could fly their MiG 23s from new airstrips built at great speed
at Cahama and Xangogo, which were much closer than Cuito
Cuanavale to the Namibian border. A decisive victory by the one
side or the other at Cuito Cuanavale would have made a settlement
unlikely; but the SADF found itself in a situation from which it
could not easily extricate^ itself without intervening on a much
larger scale, which might cost hundreds of conscript lives and
immense expenditure. Because of the arms boycott, any planes the
Air Force lost were extremely difficult to replace. Within South
Africa there was now more questioning of the war than ever
before. The Dutch Reformed Church expressed concern at the
deaths of young South Africans in a foreign country and asked, in
effect, what South Africa was doing fighting on Dehait of
UNITA.C28J. So the military agreed to what the Department of
Foreign Affairs had always wanted: the use of diplomacy rather
than military might to achieve South Wtrica's objectivts.L2VJ For
a decade, South Africa had projected an aggressive image in the
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region at little cost in white lives, and when the regime was
under challenge from within it could not be seen to be
retreating; now, with internal resistance crushed, it was no
longer so important that that image be sustained.C30]
Cuba not only Lipped the military stakes in early 1966; at the
same time, it offered, together with Angola, new terms for
peace.In talks with the Americans in Luanda in January, Angola
and Cuba not only in effect accepted linkage, but also suggested,
for the first time, that they might agree that ail Cuban troops
might be withdrawn if Namibia were given independence. There was
no question of a deal involving merely a South African withdrawal
from Angola, as in early 1934. Now the Cubans and Angolans would
only negotiate over the terms for implementing resolution 4'Sii.
Namibian independence, not the end of apartheid, would now be
Castro's justification, along with the repelling of South African
aggression, for Cuban sacrifices on the Angolan battlefield.
While the formal negotiations, which began in London in May
1988, continued in Brazzaville and then Cairo, the Cubans
increased the pressure on the South African forces in southern
Angola. They moved their 5th division to within 20kms of the
Namibian border, so for the first time posing a serious military
threat to South African forces, both those now almost encircled
at Cuito Cuanavale and those in northern Namibia itself. Angolan
and Cuban planes now began to overfly Ovamboland from the new
airstrips in Cunene province. Castro even made plans to destroy
the Ruacana hydro-electric scheme, and to launch air—strikes in
northern Namibia were the South Africans to launch a major attack
on his forces.C31] On 26 June, South African troops close to
Calueque did attack some Cubans nearby; Castro himself gave
orders that Cuban MIG 23s should be launched against the South
African positions the following day, and in that raid twelve
South African national servicemen were killed.C3ZJ That was
further evidence for the South Africans of what lay in store tor
them if they chose to pursue a military option. So that option
was ruled out, and the various parties, meeting in New York in
July, agreed to a set of principles for a settlement.
The negotiations, which then continued in Ljeneva and
Brazzaville in .the following months, might still have broken down
had it not been for the skilful and active mediation of
Crocker,C33] and the behind-the-scenes role played by the Soviet
Union, which could exert influence because it supplied Angola
with military hardware and kept Cuba afloat with massive
subsidies.[343 The United States and the Soviet Union together
suggested that it would be appropriate to implement resolution
435 in September 1988 on the tenth anmversjy of its passage. L35II
Despite the clash of late June, as the negotiations continued
each party seems to have accepted that the others sincerely
wanted a settlement, and realised that a settlement could be
reached from which they all stood to der.ive benefits - as Crocker
often said, there need be no losers - while failure of the
negotiations would probably mean great costs for all involved.
There were pressures on the South Africans to settle before the
American presidential election in November 1988, because Dukakis
promised to reject linkage and end military aid to UNITA. The
South Africans also knew that even a Bush administration was less
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likely to be as supportive as the Reagan administration Had
been. A-fter Dukakis lost, the Cubans realised tney couid not
hope.tor a change in American policy in their favour, and agreed
to sign the tripartite agreement on 22 December.
While the changed balance of military forces in southern ftngoia
pushed the South Africans into the negotiations, they were able
to extract terms which they considered acceptable. The Cuban
military contingent was to be redeployed north and withdrawn from
Angola in stages. But this withdrawal was not to be completed
before the withdrawal of South African troops from Namibia, as
the South Africans had wanted initially, nor over a seven month
period, paralleling South African withdrawal, nor over two years,
as the South Africans demanded at the outset of the talks. It
was to take place over twenty-seven months, which meant that
Pretoria had to accept that there would still be 25,000 Cuban
troops north of the 13th parallel in Angola when the last South
African troops withdrew after the Namibian election, and some
Cuban forces would remain in Angola until mid 19?1. The Cuban
withdrawal was to be monitored by a UN team, however, and a joint
commission, including the United States and the Soviet Union as
observers, was established in part to help ensure that the
timetable was observed.C36]
That the Angolan, government agreed to close down the ANC's
military training camps in central and northern Angola was seen
in Pretoria as a major victory in its long-standing attempt to
prevent Umkhonto we Siswe from operating from nearby—states. The
ANC had to relocate its camps in . Tanzania and countries even
further from South Africa. And Pretoria took satisfaction from
the fact that the agreement to implement resolution 435 was made
in negotiations from which 3WAP0 was excluded; this despite the
fact that one of the matters discussed and agreed upon by the
parties was the displacement of 3WAPQ forces. iSWAPO's exclusion
could be cited as evidence that its armed struggle had not
succeeded. South Africa insisted, as it had ail along, that
there should be no recognition ot SWAPO bases in northern
Namibia, for that would imply that SWAPO had gained territory
during the war. In terms of the Beneva Protocol of August 1V8S
Angola and Cuba were to use their good offices to ensure that all
SWAPO's fighters were to be confined to bases north of the 16th
parallel in southern Angola.
The South African government hoped that SWAPO could be
prevented from getting the critical two thirds vote which would
enable it to write the independence constitution on its own and
not have to bargain with other parties and make compromises. In
terms of the revised UN plan, the Administrator-General
controlled the whole electoral process, which meant that there
was.a lot of scope for weighting that process against SWAPO. The
administration need be restrained in its attempt to influence the
result only because the UN Special Representative had to certify
the election was free and fair. The Namibianisation of the armed
forces - the growth of the South West African Territory Force
since 1930, and, more especially, the creation of the Koevoet
counter-insurgency unitC373 — put the administration in a much
stronger position during the transitional phase than would have
been the case a decade earlier. Koevoet could be integrated in
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the South West African Police, and so need not be disbanded.[3S3
The UNTAG military component, to be cut from the original -figure
of 7500 to 4650, did not have enforcement powers in the
territory, and could do little more than passively monitor the
South A+rican troop withdrawal.
Though attempts could be made to influence the election, £39],
however, the South African government knew that it was likely
that SWAPO would win. In 198S that was not as unacceptable in
Pretoria as it had been previously. With linkage in place, there
was little likelihood of a SWAPO government inviting in Cuban
troops, or providing the ANC with military bases. Marxist
governments elsewhere were retreating from ideology to
pragmatism, and in the Gorbachev era even the South African
Minister of Defence came to acknowledge that Mar;-;ism was no
longer the danger it had been. The South African government had
•found itself able to live with a socialist Zimbabwe for almost a
decade, and it realised that any Namibian govenment would be far
more dependent on South Africa than Zimbabwe was: ninety per cent
of the country's food and manufactured goods came from the
Republic, as did the coal for its electricity; the railways were
integrated with the South African system, and alternative
transport routes would require a vast investment and take a long
time to complete. Privatisation measures adopted before
implementation began would help circumscribe any new government.
Above all, South Africa controlled Walvis Bay, the only deep
water port along the Namibian coast, through which S5/i of the
country's exports passed, and the centre for processing fish
caught in its waters. Western aid, much needed, would only be
forthcoming if the new government's policies Ue»re judged
acceptable. If a SWAPO government were to act in ways Pretoria
disliked, enormous pressures could be applied, including support
for ethnic armies to destabilise an independent Namibia, as had
happened in both Mozambique and Angola. Few in Pretoria doubted
that a SWAPO government would in practice have to accept an
essentially neo—colonial position vis a vis South Africa.
By signing the Accords, Pretoria expected to derive a range of
extraneous benefits. The Accords themselves would suggest that
constructive engagement and negotiations had worked, and
therefore that further sanctions should not be imposed on South
Africa. At a minimum, Pretoria hoped for a relaxation of
pressures while the independence process was unfolding, because
no-one would want to put tnat at risk. There was, too, the
expectation that the Accords would lead to new opportunities for
meetings between South African leaders and the leaders of African
states to the north, meetings which could be exploited to try to
break down South Africa's diplomatic isolation. And Namibian
independence might provide South Africans witn opportunities to
bypass sanctions, once the limited sanctions imposed on Namibia
because of.South African occupation had been lifted.
From Pretoria's point of view, then, settling was a risk, but
the benefits which might be derived from it were likely to
outweigh the certain costs of not settling. The Pretoria
decision—makers realised that Namibia was not, in the last
analysis, crucial to the maintenance of white power in South
Africa itself. At the crucial cabinet meeting in April 19B8, it
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was probably argued that South Africa's continued rule there had
become a liability, and that giving Namibia its independence
would serve to entrench white power in the Republic, tor with the
Namibian issue out of the way the task o+ restructuring in South
Africa might proceed more easily. Facing many pressures, the
government probably decided that it was overextended, and could
no longer afford the cost of remaining in Namibia. Neither South
A-frica's economic nor its security concerns seemed threatened.
Trade would continue, and it seemed unlikely that SWAPU would
nationalise any assets in which South Africans had a stake. The
buffer Namibia had provided had been useful, as had the
experience of warfare for the army and tor Armscor, which could
advertise its wares as battle-tested, and the use of the Caprivi
Strip had given the SADF striking power- deep into Africa. But
none of this was essential for South African security; the urange
River was an easier border to defend than the Cunene. And by 1988
the government's fear of the far right in South Africa exploiting
a settlement in Namibia, by saying that the government had sold
the whites of Namibia down the river and endangered South
Africa's security, had declined.[403 The National Party could
present the agreement as a diplomatic triumph and therefore an
electoral asset; Namibia was, Pik Botha repeated often, a
different country, and its people must decide their own future.
Nor did Pretoria expect that Vtvi oppressed majority would be able
to exploit the issue: Namibia was too remote from the lives of
most South Africans, and the state of emergency remained firmly
in place to deal with protest politics.
* * *
If the aim of South African policy in Namibia was to prevent a
SWAPU government coming to power, it failed. That PLAN had been
a military failure - as stressed by Steenkamp, tor example [413
is partially true - for it posed no military threat in the north
of Namibia in the last years of the war, and was fighting tar
into southern Angola - but it was still in being, and continued
to draw support from the people ot the north in particular. The
attempts to suppress 3WAP0 there had involved years of brutal
repression,[423 and that rendered worthless such efforts as had
been made to win 'hearts and minds'. The people c/f CJvamboland
wanted an end to the war above everything, and only a victory by
3WAP0 could guarantee that. Outside Ovamboland, the attempt to
marginalise SWAPD and establish an effective anti-SWAPQ coalition
had more success.
It is at least possible that had South Africa withdrawn from
Angola and implemented 435 in 1979 rather than 1939, Cuban combat
troops would have been withdrawn from Angola long since. As a
direct result of continued South African involvement in Angola,
their numbers increased from 19,000 in 1979C43D to 31,000 in 1984
and to 50,000 by early 1988. By aiding UNITA against FAPLA,
Pretoria in effect entered into competition with the Soviet Union
in the supply of effective weaponry. It could not win
such a competition: not only could it be outspent, but, given the
arms embargo, South Africa could not possibly keep up with the
advances in weapons technology on the other side.
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It may be that the ten years of delay in the implementation of
resolution 435 -formed a transition period of multi-racial
government sufficient to make those whites who stayed in Namibia
prepared to accept even a 3WAPQ government. The addendum to
resolution 435 accepted in 19B2 helped make SWAPO accept the idea
of a multi-party democracy. Against such advantages o-f delay
have to be set the costs o-f a decade o-f war. These included the
devastation o-f much of southern Angola and well over ten thousand
South African and Namibian lives.C443 Ultimately, the decade of
delay in Namibian decolonisation was an attempt by the apartheid
state to ensure that the people of Namibia did not vote into
office a government which would seek to escape from the South
African embrace. The extent to which an independent Namibia will
be able to escape that embrace remains to be seen, as does
whether a peaceful transition to majority rule in Namibia will
promote a similar transition in South Africa itself.
* * *
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